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Solidarity between developing countries is an
important condition for their joint exercise of
bargaining power. But solidarity is difficult to
achieve. The reason for this is best illustrated by
the case of a restrictive, price-raising cartel of
primary product exporters, but it applies with
equal force to other exercises of joint bargaining
power, such as the threat to expropriate foreign
investments, the threat to default on debts, limita-
tions on repatriation of foreign capital and profits,
the threat of the withdrawal of money balances,joint action to improve the terms of contracts
with multinationals (e.g. the withdrawal of tax
concessions), refusal to sign patent or copyright
conventions, denial of overflying rights, non-
co-operation in the control of drug-growing and
drug-traffic, and many others.
Solidarity is difficult to achieve because the more
effective a cartel or a cartel-like agreement, the
greater is the reward for any one member to
break it. But the fear that anyone may break the
agreement will induce those who would otherwise
be willing to adhere, to prepare for the break-up.
For sticking to an agreement while others
abandon it makes the loyal members worse off
than they would have been without any agree-
ment. The potential defectors cherish the hope
of operating outside the agreement. But this en-
courages on the part of the conformers the fear
of a situation without the agreement. This fear is
ever-present, even if there are no actual or poten-
tial defectors. The fear itself leads to actions that
undermine the agreement. Action outside the
agreement is an ever-present hope and action
without the agreement an ever-present threat.
Those emphasizing solidarity, joint actions,
common fronts, which give rise to such unstable
situations should, therefore, pay attention to in-
stituting a system of rewards and penalties that
shifts the incentive so as to make the unstable
solution stable.
An important source of rewards in commodity
agreements are diversification funds and technical
assistance to diversification. These have a double
virtue. First, they compensate countries for
restricting supplies and, secondly, where
opportunity costs are positive, they absorb re-
sources in alternative uses, thereby reducing the
danger of erosion of the cartel. Through geo-
graphical and commodity diversification countries
previously dependent on one or a few markets and
one or a few crops or minerals or services can
thereby be made more self-reliant and their
loyalty to the cartel increased.
Another factor that will enhance the stability of
the cartel is the ability of a supplier to do with-
out any earnings, or with substantially reduced
earnings, for a period. (This is one of the forces
that strengthens OPEC.) Withholding supplies is
a powerful weapon of the cartel. If a supplying
country is not able to withhold supplies because
it depends on earnings, the cartel can be
strengthened by other members (of this cartel or
of some other agreement) compensating the
country for withholding supplies.
It is suggested here that more thought should be
given to the provision of powerful incentives, both
rewards and penalties, which would make defec-
tion less attractive and therefore reduce the fear
of defection by others. Relevant considerations in
devising such a system of incentives will be: fair
sharing with due regard for the needs of the
poorest; reconciling differences in preferences for
the distribution of net gains over time; differences
in current and future costs of production and in
the ability to hold reserves; and others.
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